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INTRODUCTION 
Ella is in the process of becoming employed as a barista with Windy 
City Brew, an Illinois-based company.  In her new position, Windy City 
Brew would pay Ella the minimum wage amount for the State of Illinois, 
which for 2017 is $8.25 per hour.  But during discussions related to her 
future employment contract, the manager informs Ella that Windy City 
Brew requires all of its employees to sign a certain agreement.  This 
agreement prohibits employees, within the two years following the 
employee’s termination or departure from Windy City Brew from 
directly or indirectly engaging with, or contributing to, any competitor of 
Windy City Brew in any way.1  What Ella’s employer has just required 
 
* J.D. Candidate, expected May 2017, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.  She thanks the 
executive board for Volume 48 of the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal for this opportunity, 
as well as her co-author, Caitlin A. Kelly, for her continued support through this process. 
** J.D. Candidate, expected May 2017, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.  She thanks 
the executive board for Volume 48 of the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal for this 
opportunity, as well as her co-author, Jenna L. Brownlee, for her continued support through this 
process. 
1. The Authors loosely based the agreement in this hypothetical example on a form example 
from the Westlaw Practical Law database to demonstrate a common and basic noncompete 
agreement clause.  Employee Non-Compete Agreement (IL), PRAC. L. LAB. & EMP., Westlaw 
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her to sign is a classic, and somewhat standard, noncompete agreement.  
Fortunately for Ella, this type of agreement and the limitations it places 
on her post-employment plans are unenforceable, due to the newly 
enacted Illinois Freedom to Work Act—though other minimum-wage 
employees across the United States may not be so lucky. 
Under contract law, noncompete clauses or agreements are agreements 
in which one party (usually an employee) agrees to refrain from entering 
into an employment situation that is in competition with the opposite 
party (usually the employer).2  Noncompete agreements typically stem 
from an employer’s higher bargaining power and result in lower job 
mobility for the employee.3 
Historically, Illinois courts have heavily scrutinized noncompete 
agreements,4 often finding them to be unenforceable and categorizing 
them as unlawful restraints of trade.5  But Illinois courts typically uphold 
and enforce these noncompete agreements in certain situations when 
restraints are both “reasonable” and supported with adequate 
consideration.6  While there are several recent decisions relating to the 
enforceability of noncompete agreements, this Article discusses two 
standout cases that particularly shaped Illinois’ guidelines for enforcing 
noncompete covenants: Reliable Fire Equipment Co. v. Arredondo and 
Fifield v. Premier Dealer Services, Inc.7 
This Article also discusses the Illinois Freedom to Work Act (“Act”), 
 
(database updated Mar. 16, 2016). 
2. Covenant, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
3. Ryan Burke, What You Need to Know About Noncompete Agreements, and How States Are 
Responding, WHITE HOUSE BLOG, (May 5, 2016, 11:16 AM), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2016/05/05/what-you-need-know-about-non-compete-
agreements-and-how-states-are-responding; James M. Witz & Abiman Rajadurai, What Employers 
Should Know About New Ill. Noncompete Law, LAW360 (Sept. 23, 2016, 12:14 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/842414/what-employers-should-know-about-new-ill-
noncompete-law. 
4. The Authors recognize that sometimes noncompete agreements and restrictive covenants are 
used interchangeably, but that a noncompete agreement is just one type of restrictive covenant.  
Therefore, the Authors will use the more narrow “noncompete agreement” phrase throughout the 
Article when referring to agreements that restrict competition in this sense, but urge readers to note 
the parallels with these words. 
5. David S. Repking, Restrictive Covenants in Illinois: Adequate Consideration Problems Show 
That the Common Law Is an Inadequate Solution, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1071, 1072 (2015) 
(discussing Hursen v. Gavin, 44 N.E. 735, 735 (Ill. 1896)); see also Cambridge Eng’g, Inc. v. 
Mercury Partners, 827 N.E.2d 512, 522 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (“Postemployment restrictive covenants 
operate as partial restrictions on trade, so they are scrutinized carefully . . . .”). 
6. Storer v. Brock, 184 N.E. 868, 868 (Ill. 1933); Hursen, 44 N.E. at 735 (“But a contract which 
is only in partial restraint of trade is valid, provided it is reasonable and has a consideration to 
support it.”). 
7. Fifield v. Premier Dealer Servs., 2013 IL App (1st) 120327, 993 N.E.2d 938; Reliable Fire 
Equip. Co. v. Arredondo, 2011 IL 111871, 965 N.E.2d 393. 
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which Illinois Governor Bruce Rauner signed into law on August 19, 
2016.8  The Act expressly prohibits private sector employers from 
entering into any “covenants not to compete” (i.e., noncompete 
agreements) with any “low-wage employee of the employer.”9  While the 
Act provides a semispecific definition for a “low-wage employee,” the 
Act defines “covenant not to compete” much more broadly.10  Through 
this Act, Illinois has joined the list of several states taking action, 
legislative or otherwise, limiting the scope of noncompete agreements.11 
This Article first discusses how noncompete agreements are treated at 
the national level, as well how California courts have addressed these 
types of agreements.  Then, this Article examines Illinois’ approach to 
noncompete agreements by considering precedential case law and 
discussing the newly enacted Act and its impact on Illinois’ noncompete 
agreements. 
I.  THE NATION’S STANCE ON NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS 
On April 15, 2016, former United States President Barack Obama 
signed an executive order (“Order”) providing steps to increase 
competition in the United States, to better inform United States 
consumers and workers within the market, and to support the continued 
growth of the American economy.12  The Order referenced a “call to 
action” regarding noncompete agreements and listed best practices for 
state policymakers to enact reforms to reduce the prevalence of 
noncompete agreements that ultimately hurt workers and regional 
economies.13  The “call to action” urged policymakers to: (1) ban 
noncompete clauses for categories of workers such as workers under a 
certain wage threshold; (2) improve transparency and fairness of 
 
8. Illinois Freedom to Work Act, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 90/5 (West 2016). 
9. Id.; Jeffrey S. Piell & Matthew A. Sloan, Illinois Prohibits Non-Competes for Low Wage 
Employees, QUARLES & BRADY, LLP (Sept. 27, 2016), 
http://www.quarles.com/publications/illinois-prohibits-non-competes-for-low-wage-employees/. 
10. Illinois Freedom to Work Act, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 90/5 (West 2016). 
11. Kevin Cloutier & Mikela Sutrina, Illinois Limits Non-Compete Agreements Yet Again, 
SHEPPARD MULLIN LAB. & EMP. L. BLOG, (Sept. 7, 2016) 
http://www.laboremploymentlawblog.com/2016/09/articles/non-competition-covenants/illinois-
brings-down-the-hammer-on-non-compete-agreements/. 
12. Executive Order—Steps to Increase Competition and Better Inform Consumers and 
Workers to Support Continued Growth of the American Economy, WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 15, 2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/15/executive-order-steps-
increase-competition-and-better-inform-consumers. 
13. Id.; see also STATE CALL TO ACTION ON NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/competition/noncompetes-calltoaction-
final.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2017) (explaining the Order in detail) [hereinafter STATE CALL TO 
ACTION]. 
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noncompete agreements by banning noncompete agreements, unless an 
employer proposed the agreement before a job offer or before the 
employee accepted a significant promotion; and (3) incentivize 
employers to write enforceable contracts and encourage the elimination 
of unenforceable provisions.14 
And the White House is not the only branch of the United States 
government to express concerns with the overbreadth of noncompete 
agreements in the nation.  The United States Department of Treasury 
(“Treasury”) issued a report criticizing the excessive use of noncompete 
agreements.15  The Treasury’s report concluded that while noncompete 
agreements can have important social benefits, they are frequently used 
in ways that are detrimental to the interests of workers and the broader 
economy (i.e., by imposing large costs on workers).16  The report 
included a state-by-state report on key dimensions of current state 
noncompete policies and how to address them moving forward.17 
The Treasury included a state-by-state report because states vary 
greatly in the manner and degree to which they enforce noncompete 
agreements.  Some states determine the enforcement of noncompete 
agreements pursuant to established case law, while other states rely on 
statutory language.18  For example, Illinois has traditionally followed an 
established set of case law, however, in California, statutes govern the 
enforceability of noncompete agreements.19 
Section 16600 of the California Business and Professions Code 
provides that, “every contract by which anyone is restrained from 
engaging in a lawful profession, trade or business of any kind is to that 
extent void.”20  California courts strictly apply this provision and 
 
14. STATE CALL TO ACTION, supra note 13. 
15. See NON-COMPETE CONTRACTS: ECONOMIC EFFECTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS, OFFICE 
OF ECON. POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY (Mar. 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/economic-policy/Documents/UST%20Non-competes%20Report.pdf (explaining the 
improper use of noncompete agreements from the United States Treasury’s perspective). 
16. Id.  Noncompete agreements can impose large, unavoidable costs on workers given 
worker’s reduced negotiating power.  Noncompete agreements can also induce workers to leave 
their occupations entirely, therefore foregoing accumulated training and experience in their fields.  
Id. 
17. Id. 
18. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (2017) (stating by statute that noncompete 
agreements are void in the State of California); MONT. CODE ANN. § 22-703-05 (2015) (showing 
an example of a state with statutory guidance regarding noncompete agreements); see also Fifield 
v. Premier Dealer Serves., Inc., 2013 IL App (1st), 120327, ¶ 1, 993 N.E.2d 938, 939 (noting how 
Illinois is primarily a case law-based state and outlining Illinois’ noncompetition law). 
19. CAL. BUS. AND PROF. CODE § 16600 (2017). 
20. Id.; see also Scott v. Snelling & Snelling, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 1034, 1042–43 (N.D. Cal. 1990) 
(holding that employee noncompete agreements are void in California even if they are reasonably 
limited in time and geographic scope). 
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invalidate agreements that preclude employees from working for 
competitors upon the completion of their employment.21  In California, 
not only are employer noncompete agreements void, but an employer 
may also be liable for wrongful termination if it fires an employee who 
refuses to sign an employment agreement that contains a covenant not to 
compete.22 
The California Supreme Court reasons that every individual 
possesses—as a form of property—the right to pursue any calling, 
business, or profession that he or she may choose.23  Any employee also 
has the right to engage in a competitive business for himself or herself 
and to enter into competition with a former employer, even with the 
customers of his or her former employer, provided that the employee 
conducts such competition fairly and legally.24 
But section 16600 of the Code invalidates only those restraints that 
apply after termination of employment.25  Therefore, during the term of 
employment, each employee owes his or her employer a common-law 
duty of loyalty.26  This precludes the employee from competing with the 
employer in any way, whether by using the employer’s trade secrets or 
by soliciting the employer’s customers or employees.27  In fact, 
California courts have enforced at least one noncompete clause: a clause 
that restricts an employee from disclosing any company trade secret 
during and after the term of the employment or contractual engagement.28  
California finds that restricting an employee from disclosing trade secrets 
does not completely prohibit that employee from engaging in competitive 
behavior.29  But this enforceability does not allow an employer to simply 
define all information as “trade secrets” in an employee’s nondisclosure 
agreement.30  California courts have stated that there must be factual 
 
21. See generally Application Group, Inc. v. Hunter Group, Inc., 61 Cal. App. 4th 881, 895 
(1998) (finding noncompete agreements to be illegal and void in the State of California). 
22. D’Sa v. Playhut, Inc., 85 Cal. App. 4th 927, 933 (2000); but see O’Regan v. Arbitration 
Forums, Inc., 121 F.3d 1060, 1066 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that O’Regan was an employee at will 
and was subject to termination at the option of her employer, at least for nondiscriminatory 
reasons). 
23. Cont’l Car-Na-Var-Corp. v. Moseley, 24 Cal. 2d 104, 110 (1944). 
24. Id. 
25. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (2017). 
26. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2860, 2863 (2017) (outlining the duty of loyalty that California 
employees owe to their employers). 
27. Id. 
28. Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 62 Cal. 2d 239, 242 (1965); Am. Credit Indem. Co. 
v. Sacks, 213 Cal. App. 3d 622, 633–34 (1989). 
29. See generally Ret. Grp. v. Galante, 176 Cal. App. 4th 1226 (2009) (discussing the 
intersection between prohibiting disclosure of trade secrets and ensuring free competition). 
30. See, e.g., Am. Paper. & Packaging Prod., Inc. v. Kurgan, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1318, 1325 
(1986) (finding that there must be limits as to what is considered a trade secret under an employment 
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proof behind the designation to support the trade-secret clause and that 
the designation of information as a “trade secret” is not decisive in 
determining whether the court will regard it as such.31  But overall, 
California, has created a strict statutory scheme that encourages 
competition in the workplace and allows greater job opportunities for the 
citizens of California.32  California law as it stands will continue to be a 
model for other states moving forward in revaluating and rewriting their 
noncompete laws and statutes. 
II.  ILLINOIS’ CONSTRICTING APPROACH TO NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS 
Historically, common law has governed the enforceability of 
noncompete agreements between an employer and employee in Illinois.33  
Pursuant to the common-law approach, Illinois courts will only enforce a 
noncompete agreement if it is ancillary to either a valid contract or 
relationship, supported by adequate consideration, and is reasonably 
necessary to protect the legitimate business interest of the employer.34 
As Illinois courts and the Illinois legislature continue to shape 
enforcement of noncompete agreements and reform noncompete laws 
over time, they can look to other states for guidance.  Recently, Illinois 
has sought to reduce the number of enforceable noncompete agreements 
and has joined a list of several states leaning toward substantially limiting 
or abolishing noncompete agreements.35  Similar to the statutory 
guidance in California, Illinois enacted the Act, which will continue to 
lead Illinois law toward a stricter statutory scheme for regulating 
noncompete agreements and away from the once used common law. 
A.  Applicable Tests to Determine the Enforceability of Noncompete 
Agreements in Illinois 
Illinois courts have established that for a noncompete agreement to be 
enforced, the agreement must be (1) reasonable and (2) supported by 
adequate consideration36—two somewhat ambiguous standards.  The 
 
contract in California). 
31. Am. Paper, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 1325. 
32. CAL. BUS. AND PROF. CODE § 16600 (2017). 
33. 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 90/1–90/10 (2017). 
34. Peter A. Steinmeyer & David J. Clark, Non-Compete Laws: Illinois, PRAC. L. LAB. & EMP., 
Westlaw (2017). 
35. See supra Part II (discussing the Illinois Freedom to Work Act (“Act”)); infra Part I 
(discussing California’s noncompete laws). 
36. Reliable Fire Equip. Co. v. Arredondo, 2011 IL 111871, ¶ 16, 965 N.E.2d 393, 396; Brown 
& Brown, Inc. v. Mudron, 887 N.E.2d 437, 440–41 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (establishing the base 
requirements for any noncompete agreement or similar contractual agreement to be held 
enforceable in Illinois). 
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2011 Illinois Supreme Court decision in Arredondo was one that 
attempted to solidify the formula and clarify the court’s standards in 
determining the reasonableness of a noncompete agreement.37  In 
Arredondo, Reliable Fire Equipment Company (“Reliable”) filed a 
complaint against two former employees and the employees’ new place 
of employment, alleging a breach of their noncompete agreement.38  
When Reliable hired the two employees—Rene Garcia and Arnold 
Arredondo—it required them to sign noncompete agreements.39  But 
after signing these agreements, both employees became managers at the 
newly formed High Rise Security Systems, LLC (“High Rise”)—a 
company that had a stated business purpose eerily similar to Reliance’s 
mission of selling, servicing, and engineering fire alarm systems.40 
Reliable’s founder felt unnerved by this information and confronted 
the employees, asking if they were planning on competing with Reliable, 
but both employees denied the allegations.41  But within two months of 
the confrontation, Arredondo resigned, and Reliable released Garcia on 
grounds of suspicion of competition.42  Reliable later filed a complaint, 
alleging that Reliable entered into valid noncompete agreements with the 
two employees and that the employees had breached the valid 
agreements.43  The circuit court ruled that the noncompete agreements 
were unenforceable.44  A divided Illinois Appellate Court ultimately 
affirmed the circuit court’s holding, and Reliable subsequently appealed 
to Illinois’ highest court.45 
 
37. Helen W. Gunnarsson, Employment Covenants Not to Compete: The High Court Lays Down 
The Law, ILL. BAR J. (Jan. 2012), 
https://www.isba.org/ibj/2012/01/lawpulse/employmentcovenantsnottocompetetheh (discussing 
the facts and prior history of Reliable Fire Equipment Co. v. Arredondo and how the court overruled 
appellate court case law to clarify the standards set in place in their opinion). 
38. Arredondo, 2011 IL 111871, ¶ 3, 965 N.E.2d at 394. 
39. Id. ¶ 4, 965 N.E.2d at 394–95.  The noncompete agreement signed by both Garcia and 
Arredondo required employees to not compete with Reliable at any time during their employment, 
as well as forbade the employees from competing with Reliable in any way after their termination 
for one year in the states of Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin.  Id. ¶ 4, 965 N.E.2d at 394–95. 
40. Id. ¶ 5, 965 N.E.2d at 395.  Arredondo first began seeking financing for High Rise LLC in 
March 2004, while still employed with Reliable.  Id. ¶ 5, 965 N.E.2d at 395.  In April 2004, High 
Rise formed into a limited liability company.  Shortly thereafter, in August of the same year, both 
employees signed an operating agreement for High Rise.  Gunnarsson, supra note 37. 
41. Arredondo, 2011 IL 111871, ¶ 6, 965 N.E.2d at 395. 
42. Id. ¶ 6, 965 N.E.2d at 395. 
43. Id. ¶ 7, 965 N.E.2d at 395. 
44. Id. ¶ 8, 965 N.E.2d at 395 (referencing Reliable Fire Equipment Co. v. Arredondo, 2007 
WL 73338515 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2007)). 
45. Id. ¶ 9, 965 N.E.2d at 395; see Reliable Fire Equip. Co. v. Arredondo, 940 N.E.2d 153 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2010).  The Illinois Appellate Court first discusses the origin of restrictive covenants, and 
the common law surrounding them, before concluding that the circuit court’s decision that Reliable 
has no legitimate business interest to support the enforceability of the restrictive covenants.  
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The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case and 
asserted two key holdings: (1) that the legitimate business interest of an 
employer was an important component of Illinois’ reasonableness test 
that determines the enforceability of a noncompete agreement; and (2) 
that a court should determine whether a legitimate business interest is 
present on a case-by-case basis by looking to the totality of facts and 
circumstances.46 
The Illinois Supreme Court in Arredondo relied on Illinois common 
law’s well-established three-pronged test when it determined the 
reasonableness of the employees’ noncompete agreements.47  This three-
pronged test specifies that a noncompete agreement is reasonable only if 
the agreement: (1) is no greater than is required to protect a legitimate 
business interest of the employer; (2) does not impose undue hardship on 
the employee; and (3) is not injurious to the public.48 
First, the court discussed that while the appellate court in some cases 
has questioned whether Illinois recognizes the legitimate business 
interest as a requirement for reasonableness, it is very much a requirement 
and one that Illinois courts have recognized numerous times.49  
Moreover, the court cited to several Illinois opinions, all of which 
specifically established that a legitimate business purpose or interest (as 
a part of the three-pronged test) is a requirement for testing 
reasonableness in noncompete agreements.50  To further assert its 
position regarding the validity of the legitimate business interest 
component of the three-pronged test, the court overruled the appellate 
court’s findings in Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v. Ehlers that the legitimate 
business interest component of the three-pronged test was never actually 
 
Arredondo, 940 N.E.2d at 180–84.  The concurrence by Justice Hudson echoed that the conclusion 
was correct, though the reasoning behind it was not.  Id. at 184 (Hudson, J., specially concurring). 
46. Arredondo, 2011 IL 111871, ¶ 43, 965 N.E.2d at 403. 
47. Id. ¶ 17, 965 N.E.2d at 396–97 (quoting BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 712 N.E.2d 1220, 1223 
(N.Y. 1999)). 
48. Id. ¶ 17, 965 N.E.2d at 396–97 (noting that the “extent of the employer’s legitimate business 
interest may be limited by type of activity, geographical area, and time”). 
49. Id. ¶ 17, 965 N.E.2d at 397 (“This court long ago established the three-dimensional rule of 
reason in Illinois and has repeatedly acknowledged the requirement of the promisee’s [employer’s] 
legitimate business interest down to the present day.”). 
50. Id. ¶¶ 18–24, 965 N.E.2d at 397–98 (noting that court “has repeatedly recognized the three-
dimensional rule of reason, specifically including the element of the legitimate business interest of 
the promise”); see generally Mohanty v. St. John Heart Clinic, S.C., 866 N.E.2d 85 (Ill. 2006) 
(establishing that the legitimate business purpose factor is a necessary requirement when attempting 
distinguish the reasonableness of an agreement); House of Vision, Inc. v. Hiyane, 225 N.E.2d 21 
(Ill. 1967) (same); Cockerill v. Wilson, 281 N.E.2d 648 (Ill. 1972) (same); Bauer v. Sawyer, 134 
N.E.2d 329 (Ill. 1956) (same); Hursen v. Gavin, 44 N.E. 735 (Ill. 1896) (same); Linn v. Sigsbee, 
67 Ill. 75 (1873) (same). 
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valid in Illinois.51 
The court then discussed the proper definition of a legitimate business 
purpose.52  The court discussed how several Illinois courts have 
attempted to delineate the applicable factors,53 but that these “lists of 
factors” do not provide an exact formula and are not intended to be 
exclusive.54 
The court noted that in Nationwide Advertising Service, Inc. v. Kolar, 
the Illinois Appellate Court attempted to create an exact formula to assess 
if a legitimate business interest is present.55  The Illinois Appellate Court 
in Kolar proposed a two-factor test, finding that a court would enforce a 
noncompete agreement if: (1) the employee acquired confidential 
information during the course of his or her employment and used that 
information to benefit himself or herself and (2) there was a near-
permanent customer relationship present.56  While many Illinois courts 
have applied this test to determine the enforceability of noncompete 
agreements in the wake of Kolar,57 the court in Arredondo strikes down 
 
51. Arredondo, 2011 IL 111871, ¶¶ 28–30, 965 N.E.2d at 399–400 (citing Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. 
v. Ehlers, 915 N.E.2d 862, 869 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009)). 
52. Id. ¶¶ 33–35, 965 N.E.2d at 400–01. 
53. Id. ¶¶ 33–35, 965 N.E.2d at 400–01; see also Chambers-Dobson, Inc. v. Squier, 472 N.W.2d 
391 (Neb. 1991) (finding that a list of factors does not properly encompass any and all possible 
scenarios, and therefore is not the one, true appropriate method for determining a legitimate 
business interest); Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland Inc. v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 695 
(Ohio Ct. C.P. 1952) (affirming Briggs v. Butler, 45 N.E.2d 757, 761 (Ohio 1942), stating that a 
list of conditions is not an effective way to precisely identify a legitimate business purpose, as a list 
is expansive and ever-changing); see generally 15 GRACE MCLANE GIESEL, CORBIN ON 
CONTRACTS, § 80.6 at 70 (rev. ed. 2003). 
54. Arredondo, 2011 IL 111871, ¶ 35, 965 N.E.2d at 401 (“The factors or considerations to be 
used in that balancing test are not weighted; that is there is no prescribed method by which more or 
less weight is assigned to each factor to be considered in the balancing test . . . .” (quoting 
Chambers-Dobson, Inc. v. Squier, 472 N.W.2d 391, 400 (Neb. 1991))); see also Arthur Murray, 
105 N.E.2d at 695 (“‘The determination of the necessity for such restriction is dependent upon the 
nature and extent of the business and the nature and extent of the service of the employee in 
connection therewith and other pertinent conditions.’  No court seems to have attempted to make 
a list of those ‘other pertinent conditions.’”). 
55. Arredondo, 2011 IL 111871, ¶ 36, 965 N.E.2d at 401 (referring to Nationwide Advert. Serv., 
Inc. v. Kolar, 329 N.E.2d 300 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975)). 
56. See Nationwide Advert. Serv., 329 N.E.2d at 302 (holding that because the defendant had 
been a total stranger to the area in which he was hired, and that his employment opportunity with 
the plaintiff provided him with his future contacts and the clientele, the plaintiff had a legitimate 
business interest in limiting the defendant and requiring a noncompete agreement); see generally 
Canfield v. Spear, 254 N.E.2d 433 (Ill. 1969) (enforcing a noncompete agreement after finding that 
a doctor who had never lived in Rockford, Illinois, prior to joining a certain medical group and who 
had not brought a single client with him, exhibited a near-permanent customer relationship). 
57. See generally Hanchett Paper Co. v. Melchiorre, 792 N.E.2d 395 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) 
(finding that the two-pronged test defined in Kolar was a fair and accurate way to determine the 
enforceability of agreements in disputes regarding noncompete agreement); Dam, Snell & 
Taveirne, Ltd. v. Verchota, 754 N.E.2d 464, 468–69 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (same); Carter–Shields v. 
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this “test,” finding that the factors are mere aids in determining a 
legitimate business interest.58  Additionally, the Arredondo court 
explains that a legitimate business purpose is only one prong of the test 
to determine reasonableness, and to determine if this interest is present, 
courts should look to the totality of the circumstances and decide on a 
case-by-case basis.59 
By reaching this conclusion, the court seemingly establishes once and 
for all that a legitimate business interest is still a viable test in the three-
pronged analysis of determining enforceability of noncompete 
agreements and that when deciphering whether a legitimate business 
interest is present, each individual case must be assessed and all facts and 
circumstances must be considered.60 
Fifield is another key case in the formation of Illinois’ trend of limited 
enforcement of noncompete agreements.61  In this case, the First District 
of the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed a circuit court’s less-than-clear 
decision that required another requirement—adequate consideration—to 
be present for a court to enforce a noncompete agreement.62 
In Fifield, an employee of a separate company, Great American 
Insurance Company (“GAIC”), worked almost exclusively with Premier 
Dealer Services (“Premier”) during his time at GAIC.63  But after the sale 
of Premier to Premier Dealer Services Holdings, LLC (“PDS Holdings”), 
Fifield was alerted that he would be let go from GAIC but that PDS 
Holdings had a job offer for him.64  With this new arrangement, however, 
 
Alton Health Inst., 739 N.E.2d 569, 575–76 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (same); Springfield Rare Coin 
Galleries, Inc. v. Mileham, 620 N.E.2d 479, 484–85 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (same); A.B. Dick Co. v. 
Am. Pro–Tech, 514 N.E.2d 45, 48–49 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (same); Reinhardt Printing Co. v. Feld, 
490 N.E.2d 1302, 1306–07 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (same). 
58. Reliable Fire Equip. Co. v. Arredondo, 2011 IL 111871, ¶ 42, 965 N.E.2d 393, 403. 
59. Id. ¶ 42, 965 N.E.2d at 403.  The court notes that the precedent applying the Kolar test is 
still valid, however these tests and factors are nonconclusive and only applicable when determining 
legitimate business interests as a part of the three-pronged enforceability analysis—not as the three-
pronged analysis’ replacement.  Id. ¶ 42, 965 N.E.2d at 403. 
60. Id. ¶ 43, 965 N.E.2d at 403. 
61. Fifield v. Premier Dealer Servs., Inc., 2013 IL App (1st), 120327, 993 N.E.2d 938. 
62. Fifield, 2013 IL App. (1st) 120327, ¶ 21, 993 N.E.2d at 944; see Ford, Harrison, LLP, Upon 
Further Consideration, Clarity Is Elusive, 24 ILL. EMP. L. LETTER 6, 6 (June 2014) (“Following 
the appellate court’s decision in Fifield, business and employer advocacy groups were hopeful that 
the Illinois Supreme Court would agree to hear the case on appeal and provide more clarity on the 
enforceability of restrictive covenants.  However, the high court declined to do so.”). 
63. GAIC actually owned Premier until GAIC sold the company to Premier Dealer Services 
Holdings, LLC, a separate and third party.  Fifield, 2013 IL App. (1st) 120327, ¶ 3, 993 N.E.2d at 
939; see also Brief for Appellant at 1–2, Fifield, 2013 IL App. (1st) 120327, 993 N.E.2d 938 (No. 
10 CH 9204) (providing details of the company’s ownership over the course of the events which 
lead to the litigation). 
64. Fifield, 2013 IL App. (1st) 120327, ¶ 3, 993 N.E.2d at 939. 
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Fifield was required to sign an agreement prior to his employment, which 
included several nonsolicitation and noncompetition provisions.65  After 
signing the agreement, Fifield began working for PDS Holdings, but 
resigned a mere three days after the beginning of his employment.66  
Shortly after his departure, another competitor of PDS Holdings, 
Enterprise Financial Group, Inc. (“EFG”) employed Fifield.67 
The Illinois Appellate Court starts its analysis by clarifying that, for it 
to enforce a noncompete agreement similar to the one in Fifield, the terms 
of that covenant must be reasonable—a standard that preceding case law 
established.68  But before reaching this analysis, the court must decide 
two additional facts: (1) whether the noncompete agreement was 
ancillary to a valid contract and (2) whether there was adequate 
consideration supporting the agreement.69  The issue that the Illinois 
Appellate Court faced was whether adequate consideration had been 
given in support of the agreement that Fifield signed, prior to his 
employment with PDS Holdings.70 
PDS Holdings began its argument with the idea that the consideration 
offered in this agreement was Fifield’s employment opportunity itself.71  
Additionally PDS Holdings asserted that the agreement may have been a 
noncompete agreement, but that it was not a postemployment restrictive 
covenant72 because Fifield was not technically an employee at the time 
of the signing.73  Fifield and EFG countered by claiming that PDS 
Holdings did not provide adequate consideration to support the 
agreement given that Illinois law typically equates two years of continued 
employment as adequate consideration.74 
 
65. Id. ¶ 3, 993 N.E.2d at 939.  Fifield negotiated with Premier regarding the agreement and 
successfully convinced the parties to agree to a provision which stated that the restrictive provisions 
in the agreement would not apply if the company terminated Fifield without cause during the first 
year of his employment.  Id. ¶ 4, 993 N.E.2d at 940. 
66. Id. ¶ 4, 993 N.E.2d at 940; Repking, supra note 5, at 1072. 
67. Fifield, 2013 IL App. (1st) 120327, ¶ 4, 993 N.E.2d at 940. 
68. Id. ¶ 13, 993 N.E.2d at 942. 
69. Id. ¶ 13, 993 N.E.2d at 942; see also Lawrence & Allen, Inc. v. Cambridge Human Res. 
Grp., Inc., 685 N.E.2d 434, 440 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (noting the additional facts a court must discuss 
prior to analyzing whether a contract is reasonable). 
70. Fifield, 2013 IL App. (1st) 120327, ¶ 13, 993 N.E.2d at 942. 
71. Id. ¶ 9, 993 N.E.2d at 940–41.  PDS Holdings argued that because Fifield was not employed 
at the time of signing, unlike the Illinois case law Fifield relied on in his arguments, the employment 
offer was adequate consideration.  Id. ¶ 9, 993 N.E.2d at 940–41. 
72. The court did not approve PDS Holdings’ proposed arbitrary definition of a 
“postemployment restive covenant.”  Id. ¶ 18, 993 N.E.2d at 943. 
73. “Premier argues that the holding in [Mudron] is not applicable to this case because, unlike 
the defendant in [Mudron], Fifield was not employed by Premier when he signed the agreement.”  
Id. ¶ 17, 993 N.E.2d at 943. 
74. Id. ¶ 10, 993 N.E.2d at 941 (explaining that Illinois courts have also noted that the length of 
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The Illinois Appellate Court agreed with Fifield in that the fact pattern 
of another appellate court decision, Brown & Brown, Inc. v. Mudron, 
resembled the facts in Fifield.75  In Mudron, Brown & Brown, Inc. 
required the defendant-employee to sign an employment agreement after 
Brown & Brown, Inc., purchased her original employer, John Manner 
Insurance Agency.76  This employment agreement contained a 
noncompete agreement, prohibiting the employee from competing with 
Brown & Brown, Inc., in any way for two years after her employment 
had ceased.77  But seven months after signing the agreement, the 
employee resigned and began working for a competitor of Brown & 
Brown, Inc., at which time her former employer brought a lawsuit against 
her for breach of contract.78  The Illinois Appellate Court in Mudron held 
that without any additional benefits, seven months of continued 
employment was not adequate consideration to support the noncompete 
agreement.79  Pursuant to the reasoning in Mudron, the court in Fifield 
reasoned that if seven months in Mudron was not adequate for 
consideration, surely three months did not meet the standard either.80 
In Fifield, PDS Holdings argued that Mudron was distinguishable 
because in Mudron, the employee signed the agreement while employed, 
but the employee in Fifield signed the agreement prior to his 
 
time required to constitute adequate consideration remains the same (historically, two years) 
regardless of the circumstances surrounding the employee’s exit from the company). 
75. Id. ¶ 17, 993 N.E.2d at 943 (refusing to agree with PDS Holdings’ allegation that Mudron 
is not dispositive of the issues in this case); see Brown & Brown, Inc. v. Mudron, 887 N.E.2d 437, 
440 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (“Under Illinois law, continued employment for a substantial period of 
time beyond the threat of discharge is sufficient consideration to support a restorative covenant in 
an employment agreement.”). 
76. Mudron, 887 N.E.2d at 438–39. 
77. Id. at 438–39.  In Mudron, the defendant worked as a customer service representative for 
her employer.  Id.  The agreement listed a number of competitive practices the employee was 
prohibited from partaking in, including soliciting or servicing any of the plaintiff’s customers, and 
disclosing confidential information.  Id.  The Authors note that the case’s language refers to the 
agreement as a “postemployment restrictive covenant,” but for the purposes of this Article, the 
nature of the discussed agreement is that of a noncompete agreement, and the enforceability 
standards remain the same. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 441; see also Mid-Town Petroleum, Inc. v. Gowen, 611 N.E.2d 1221, 1227 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1993) (“Here, Gowen’s continued post contract employment was approximately seven months.  
We note, here, that Gowen’s continued post contract employment was comparatively 
insubstantial.”).  The court cites to Mid-Town to assert that seven months of employment is 
insufficient to establish adequate consideration in this case, regardless if the employee resigned.  
Mudron, 887 N.E.2d at 440–41. 
80. Fifield, 2013 IL App. (1st) 120327, ¶ 19, 993 N.E.2d at 943; see Mudron, 887 N.E.2d at 441 
(comparing the durations of employment to show a lack of adequate consideration); see also 
Repking, supra note 5, at 1079 (comparing the facts of Mudron to that of Fifield to support the 
court’s final findings that there was no consideration adequate enough to enforce the contract in 
Fifield). 
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employment.81  The Fifield court rejected this argument and found that 
no difference existed between an employee signing an agreement at the 
start of his or her employment and an employee who signed an agreement 
during his or her employment.82 
The Fifield court’s holding provides a clearer analysis for determining 
adequate consideration by holding that an Illinois court will not enforce 
a noncompete agreement without two years of consecutive employment 
or some other type of consideration.83  Employers may find themselves 
attempting to create additional benefits or advantages to offer employees 
in hopes of passing the test to establish the adequate consideration, or fear 
that any noncompete agreement executed may not provide the protection 
they had hoped it would.84  These cases demonstrate how Illinois courts 
dissect noncompete agreements and how they diligently analyze the facts 
and apply case law, typically in favor of nonenforcement.85 
B.  The Illinois Freedom to Work Act 
Though Illinois case law provided a basis for analyzing noncompete 
agreements, the Illinois legislature faced statewide concerns regarding 
noncompete agreements, specifically regarding the highly restrictive 
noncompete terms included in the hourly employee employment 
agreements of a popular sandwich franchise, Jimmy John’s.86 
 
81. Fifield, 2013 IL App. (1st) 120327, ¶ 17, 993 N.E.2d at 943. 
82. Id. ¶ 17, 993 N.E.2d at 943; see generally Bires v. WalTom, LLC, 662 F. Supp. 2d 1019 
(N.D. Ill. 2009) (discussing further that the time at which an employee signs a noncompete 
agreement has no bearing on whether the agreement shall be enforced).  In Bires v. WalTom, LLC, 
a racecar driver signed a noncompete agreement that prohibited him from negotiating or signing 
with another team for forty-five days from the day of his employment.  Bires, 662 F. Supp. 2d at 
1024.  But, the driver signed the agreement during his employment (i.e., not prior to his start date).  
Id.  The United States District Court in the Northern District of Illinois held that there was no 
difference between covenants that are signed pre- or post- start of employment.  Id. at 1030.  
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit made it very clear that “the only effect of drawing a distinction 
between pre-hire and post-hire covenants would be to induce employers whose employees had 
signed such a covenant after they started working to fire those employees and rehire them the 
following day with a fresh covenant not to compete.”  Id. (referring to the Seventh Circuit holding 
in Curtis 1000 Inc., v. Suess, 24 F.3d 941, 947 (7th Cir. 1994)). 
83. Repking, supra note 5, at 1072. 
84. Id. at 1080 (discussing how the use of bonuses or promotions within the employee’s current 
scope of employment have been discussed as options to provide additional benefits to employees 
in hopes of protecting restrictive covenants).  The Authors note, however, that promotions within 
the employee’s current employment opportunity will likely not justify as an “additional benefit” 
for recently hired employees as courts may consider these bonuses as a mere signing bonus 
applicable to all employees—lowering the appeal of these types of advantages for highly sought 
after employees.  Id. at 1080–81. 
85. Reliable Fire Equip. Co. v. Arredondo, 2011 IL 111871, ¶ 42, 965 N.E.2d 393, 403; see 
Fifield, 2013 IL App. (1st) 120327, ¶ 4, 993 N.E.2d at 940 (restricting overbroad enforcement of 
noncompete agreements in Illinois). 
86. See Complaint at 17, People v. Jimmy John’s Franchise LLC, No. 2016-CH-07746 (Ill. Cir. 
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In June 2016, the Illinois Attorney General, Lisa Madigan, filed a 
lawsuit against two Jimmy John’s corporate entities.87  The complaint 
argued that the noncompete agreements that Jimmy John’s forced their 
low-wage employees to sign were illegal and unenforceable under Illinois 
law.88  Attorney General Lisa Madigan, arguing on behalf of the State of 
Illinois, asserted that the noncompete agreements that Jimmy John’s 
required their employees to sign restricted their low-wage employees 
during, and for two years after, their employment from working in any 
other business that earned more than 10 percent of its revenue from 
selling “submarine-hero-type, deli-style, pita, and/or wrapped or rolled 
sandwiches.”89  The noncompete agreement also applied to any sandwich 
business located within three miles of any Jimmy John’s sandwich 
shop.90  Attorney General Madigan reasoned that “preventing employees 
from seeking employment with a competitor is unfair to Illinois workers 
and bad for Illinois businesses” and that “by locking low-wage workers 
into their jobs and prohibiting them from seeking better paying jobs 
elsewhere, the companies have no reason to increase their wage or 
benefits.”91 
In December 2016, Jimmy John’s agreed to settle with the Illinois 
Attorney General’s office and agreed to use noncompete agreements that 
complied with Illinois law going forward.92  In other words, Jimmy 
 
Ct. June 8, 2016) (alleging that all of Jimmy John’s noncompete agreements with minimum wage 
employees should be found to be illegal as they unfairly lock minimum-wage employees into their 
jobs); see also Madigan Sues Jimmy John’s for Imposing Unlawful Non-Compete Agreements on 
Sandwich Makers and Delivery Drivers, ILL. ATT’Y GEN. (June 8, 2016), 
http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2016_06/20160608.html [hereinafter Madigan 
Sues Jimmy John’s] (stating that the agreements in question were signed primarily by low-wage 
sandwich shop employees, including delivery drivers whose primary job tasks involved taking food 
orders and making and delivering sandwiches). 
87. Complaint, Jimmy John’s Franchise LLC, No. 2016-CH-07746; see also Madigan Sues 
Jimmy John’s, supra note 86 (stating that the noncompete agreements affected an astonishing 
number of people in Illinois given that together with its franchise and the corporate locations, 
Jimmy John’s operates nearly 300 sandwich shops in Illinois). 
88. Complaint, Jimmy John’s Franchise LLC, No. 2016-CH-07746. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. (stating that a later version of the agreement limited this to two miles within any Jimmy 
John’s located within the United States). 
91. Id.; see Madigan Sues Jimmy John’s, supra note 86 (explaining Jimmy John’s lawsuit in 
detail). 
92. Jimmy John’s settled to pay $100,000 to the Illinois Attorney General’s office for education 
and outreach, specifically to raise public awareness on how noncompete agreements can be 
enforced.  Madigan Announces Settlement with Jimmy John’s for Imposing Unlawful Non-Compete 
Agreements, ILL. ATT’Y GEN. (Dec. 7, 2016), 
http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2016_12/20161207.html.  Jimmy John’s also 
agreed to notify all current and former low-wage sandwich shop employees and delivery drivers 
that their noncompete agreements will not be enforced, remove the noncompetes from materials 
required from new hires, and notify franchisees to void any noncompete agreements that were 
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John’s agreed to base all noncompete agreements “on a legitimate 
business interest” and to narrowly tailor the agreements “in terms of time, 
activity, and place.”93 
But this promise was not good enough for the Illinois legislature.  The 
Illinois legislature did not want this situation to occur in other Illinois 
companies.  Therefore, the legislature passed the Act, which bans 
noncompete agreements for low-wage, private-sector employees, and 
Illinois Governor Bruce Rauner signed the Act into law on August 19, 
2016.94  The Act does not retroactively apply and therefore concerns only 
agreements presented to low-wage employees on or after January 1, 
2017.95 
The Act defines a “low-wage employee” as an employee who earns the 
greater of (1) the applicable federal ($7.25 per hour), state ($8.25 per 
hour), or local minimum wage ($10.50 hour), or (2) $13.00 per hour.96  
Moreover, the Act broadly defines “covenant not to compete” as an 
agreement between an employer and a low-wage employee that restricts 
the employee from performing: (1) any work for another employer for a 
specified period of time; (2) any work in a specified geographical area; 
or (3) work for another employer that is similar to the low-wage 
employee’s work for the employee in question.97  The requirements of 
 
modeled after Jimmy John’s corporate version.  Id. 
93. Id. (noting that the Act now applies to all low-wage employees and the future noncomete 
agreements only apply to workers making $13.00 per hour or more); see also Jimmy John’s Agrees 
to Pay $100,000 to Illinois AG over Non-compete Contracts, CHICAGO TRIB., (Feb. 28, 2017), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-jimmy-johns-settlement-1208-biz-20161207-
story.html (stating that Jimmy John’s has agreed to pay $100,000 in the settlement with the Illinois 
Attorney General’s office). 
94. Illinois Freedom to Work Act, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 90/5 (West 2016); see also Bill 
Status of SB3163, ILL. GEN. ASSEMBLY, 
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/billstatus.asp?DocNum=3163&GAID=13&GA=99&DocTypeID
=SB&LegID=96505&SessionID=88&SpecSess= (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (detailing the Illinois 
legislature’s process in approving the Act); see also Kevin M. Cloutier, Illinois Limits Non-
Compete Agreements Yet Again, NAT’L L. REV. (Sept. 7, 2016), 
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/illinois-limits-non-compete-agreements-yet-again (“All too 
often, employers routinely issue non-compete agreements with new hire packets to employees who 
pose no real threat to the company’s legitimate business or protectable interests if they were to 
leave the company and join a competitor.  Under judicial scrutiny, these agreements would likely 
not pass muster due to the lack of underlying protectable interests.”); see also James M. Witz & 
Abiman Rajadurai, What Employers Should Know About New Ill. Noncompete Law, LAW360 (Sept. 
23, 2016, 12:14 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/842414/what-employers-should-know-
about-new-ill-noncompete-law (informing Illinois employees of their new rights associated with 
the Act). 
95. Illinois Freedom to Work Act, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 90/5 (West 2016). 
96. Id. 
97. Id.  Though it defines “covenant not to compete” broadly, the Act does not apply to 
nondisclosure agreements or covenants restricting solicitation of customers or employees.  Id.; 
Steven L. Brennenman, Illinois Law Will Ban Restrictive Covenants for Low Earners, 27 ILL. EMP. 
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the Act differ greatly from a “normal” case involving noncompete 
agreements in Illinois.98  Under Illinois law, courts generally enforce 
noncompete agreements that restrict the employee from competing in a 
specific geographical area for no longer than required to protect the 
employer.99  Illinois courts typically require the specific geographical 
area to be no more than 100 miles in radius from the current employer.100 
Overall, the Act will have a positive impact on Illinois employees.101  
The Act will allow low-wage employees more employment options, as 
they will not be restricted by their initial minimum wage job.102  The Act 
was a very clear response by the Illinois legislature that it will not allow 
for overuse of noncompete agreements by employers and that the 
legislature is here to protect the employees of Illinois.103 
CONCLUSION 
The Illinois legislature’s enactment of the Act clearly demonstrates 
and exemplifies the nation’s movement toward drastically limiting—or 
completely eliminating—the scope and enforceability of noncompete 
agreements.  Employers in Illinois who continue to require noncompete 
agreements across all areas of work must take this Act into consideration 
and adjust their practices adequately.104  While the Act currently appears 
to apply only to noncompete agreements, not all restrictive covenants, 
Illinois employers should stay informed for possible future statutes or 
court cases expanding the reach of the Act.105  Furthermore, Illinois 
courts will not enforce agreements at all if the employees make less than 
$13.00 dollars per hour.106  But the Act serves as a healthy reminder to 
Illinois employers that Illinois courts will continue to heavily scrutinize 
noncompete agreements and will only enforce them if they are reasonably 
tailored to protect a legitimate business interest of the employer and align 
with the geographical limitations required by the Illinois courts in 
 
L. LETTER 7, 7 (2016). 
98. See supra Part II.A. (discussing Illinois’ noncompete laws in detail). 
99. Liataud v. Liautaud, 221 F.3d 981, 987 (7th Cir. 2000). 
100. Shorr Paper Prod., Inc. v. Frary, 392 N.E.2d 1148, 1152 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (stating that 
in a “normal” case involving the enforceability of a noncompete agreement, an appropriate 
geographical area to restrict an employee is 100 miles). 
101. See Cloutier, supra note 94 (explaining the benefits to employees of restricting 
noncompete agreements). 
102. Id. 
103. See supra notes 94–103 and accompanying text (discussing the Act). 
104. See Repking, supra note 5, at 1072 (discussing what employers will need to address in 
future noncompete agreements). 
105. See Brennenman, supra note 97, at 7 (stating that the Act currently only applies to 
noncompete agreements between employers and low-level employees). 
106. Illinois Freedom to Work Act, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 90/5 (West 2016). 
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noncompete agreements.107 
 
107. Shorr Paper Prod., Inc. v. Frary, 392 N.E.2d 1148, 1151–52 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Repking, 
supra note 5, at 1072–74. 
